Convergence occurs in war and bargaining models as uninformed rivals discover their opponent's type by fighting and making calibrated offers that only the weaker party would accept. Fighting ends with the compromise that reveals the other side's type. We show that, if the protagonists are free to fight and bargain in the time continuum, they no longer make increasing concessions in an attempt to end the war promptly and on fair terms. Instead, our rivals stand firm on extreme bargaining positions, fighting it out in the hope that the other side will give in, until much of the war has been fought. Despite ongoing resolution of uncertainty by virtue * The order of the authors' names is not indicative of their respective contributions that they consider equal. We thank anonymous reviewers for extensive and insightful feedback.
of time passing, the rivals choose not to try to narrow their differences by negotiating.
Introduction
Reflecting upon issues of bargaining in war, James Fearon points to the 'nearly universal tendency for states at war and parties to civil conflicts to simply fight for extended periods of time without making serious offers for a negotiated settlement.'
1 Paul Pillar, in a detailed examination of bargaining behavior between states at war, confirms that warring states rarely attempt to negotiate.
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Instead he finds that the parties negotiated before an armistice in only nineteen of one hundred and forty two interstate wars examined. And even when states engaged in pre-armistice negotiations, 'it was only after a period of fighting without talking that the parties began to talk..'. Can rationality explain such behavior?
In the absence of commitment issues, explaining silence in war requires understanding why states at war would choose to fight without probing the other side for a possibly war-ending settlement. But such probing is at the core of the Principle of Convergence according to which wars should end on mutually agreeable terms when uncertainty about the other side has been resolved, and fighting no longer serves to inform on the terms of a settlement. War and bargaining models describe the process that underlies this principle by specifying the screening procedures that leads to the identification of the players' true prospects through bargaining and the observation of battle outcomes. 7 The process is designed to separate player types so that the rivals can avoid as much costly fighting as possible while making peace without conceding more than is necessary for the opponent to agree to settle. It requires that rivals bargain while they fight, adjusting their offers as they observe the outcome of battle and the other side's negotiating behavior, and it precludes fighting to pressure the other side to surrender to outstanding demands. While this process is formally rational and efficient, it remains at odds with what we know about states at war.
If we are to explain silence in war as a rational choice, barring commitment 6 White, The Diplomacy of the Russo Japanese War, p. 199. 7 Technically, uncertainty is reduced by a screening process that separates the types for the uninformed player. The situation is very different if there is a commitment problem as in Fearon, 'Fighting Rather than Bargaining'. Fearon shows that the use of offers by a Government to separate the weak insurgents from the strong is precluded (under certain conditions about frequency of offers) by the fact that the weak expect the Government to renege. Because of this commitment problem, the Government can only attempt to screen and separate the types by observing the result of fighting. If the weak hold out long enough, the cost to the Government of continuing to fight outweighs the benefits of making an offer that both weak and strong will accept. The Government will then make a pooling offer.
problems, we can no longer model the process of bargaining and fighting as a search for separation of types achieved through the well orchestrated, alternating, rounds of offers and counteroffers that characterize discrete time war and bargaining models. Indeed, in a discrete time framework, the players must wait for their turn. But postponing a decision until the next period means incurring a cost that is commensurate with the fixed delay imposed by waiting. This puts a premium on early resolution so that waiting is only worthwhile if it serves to resolve uncertainties, improving the terms of a final settlement. Any other rationale for temporizing is implicitly ruled out by the discrete-time framework. As a result, fighting stops once the players are made aware of their true prospects by the outcome of the fight and each other's observed bargaining behavior. This is no longer the case if we allow players to bargain and fight in the time continuum, making offers and counteroffers at the time of their choosing. As delay no longer imposes a fixed cost, although delay remains costly, the protagonists can decide to continue fighting in order to apply just enough pressure to persuade a weak opponent to surrender.
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To investigate war and bargaining in this context, we develop a continuous time model that allows the parties to make and accept offers at any time but allows the dispute to be settled on the battlefield should bargaining fail. The dynamic progression of the war is described by the standard Lanchester model.
Our rivals are uncertain about each other's priorities, and war can lead one party to a victory, but it can also lead to a stalemate. We therefore relax many of the assumptions that are made in the war and bargaining literature. But most importantly, we create a game in which states can choose to remain silent, or not, while they fight.
8 Unlike the continuous time framework, discrete time does not allow the players to manipulate the costs imposed by delaying tactics when using pure strategies. Using mixed strategies would allow such manipulation but would raise technical problems as well as the familiar interpretation issues that are associated to probabilistic strategies.
Using the standard perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Markov strategies 9 we find that while the players' types are revealed by their willingness to continue the fight they do not attempt to actively screen each other by making significant and separating offers. Instead, whatever the expected outcome of war, the rivals fight without making any bargaining concession for most of the conflict, preferring to wait it out in the hope that the other side will give in to outstanding demands. Only when one side's victory becomes imminent does the victor receive offers that are barely better than what he can guarantee himself by fighting to the finish. Moreover, our results continue to hold as the magnitude of uncertainty is reduced, either parametrically, at the modeling stage, or as the players gain information after the parameters are set and the game proceeds.
In sum, convergence of beliefs does not result from a convergence of offers in our model. We predict instead that an enduring divergence of positions persists well into the last stages of the conflict.
The rationality of this uncompromising bargaining behavior hinges on the following calculus: the player who considers offering a compromise will weigh the lower war costs associated to an expected early settlement, against the opportunity cost of having the other side secure a better deal. In our model, war costs are not arbitrarily constrained by discrete-time assumptions and can be freely manipulated by the players' timing strategies. In this context, the trade- on the battlefield.
Conceptual Issues and Model Assumptions
The emergence of attrition behavior and the failure of bargaining when states at war can choose the timing of offers and counter-offers is a provocative result that runs counter to the established wisdom embodied in the Principle of Con-
vergence. To what extent do our modeling assumptions drive our conclusions?
Is our result an artifact of continuous time modeling? And is it reasonable to assume that state actors make decisions in continuous time?
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Are states truly free to make or accept offers at the time of their choosing? From a practical standpoint, one could argue that discrete time modeling is appropriate because decision makers need some time to respond to offers or formulate counter-offers and need, throughout the war, to pause to reevaluate their plans in light of observed developments. Such reasoning is technically and conceptually flawed. Technically, optimal acceptance times in our model are given by continuous probability distributions. This means that an instantaneous acceptance has probability zero and can therefore never happen. And the probability that the players receive a very fast response to their offers is commensurately very small. Decision makers will therefore take some time to respond to an offer with high probability. Moreover in a game theoretic framework, whether in discrete or continuous time, strategies are complete contingency plans made by the players at the very start of the game. Players do not pause to reevaluate their plans in equilibrium. We therefore rule out this line of argument as a rationale for adopting a discrete time framework.
From a technical standpoint, it is important to note that continuous time modeling does not mean that players make decisions at each instant. Continuous 30 This discussion is inspired by the extensive and insightful feedback received from one of the anonymous reviewers of this article.
time decision making is not to be interpreted as what happens when the length of the decision period in a discrete time model is made arbitrarily small. Instead, the continuous time framework avoids the theorist-imposed fixed cost of delay incurred if players wait till the next period to take action. It merely allows the protagonists to choose the timing of their bargaining moves and the pace at which they screen the adversary for resolve by making serious settlement offers.
The real issue is whether it is in their best interest to do so. Our core finding is that it is not. Rational players prefer to make zero offers for most of the war letting the other side's willingness to surrender be the only source of information on type.
Are our findings on bargaining failure and attrition behavior artifacts of continuous time modeling? To answer such a question, we would need to be sure that our results cannot emerge from a discrete time model. The competing discrete time models search for separating equilibria in contexts that are arguably quite restrictive. The most sophisticated discrete time models by Slantchev and Powell 31 allow only one-sided uncertainty. And Powell allows only one side to make offers while Slantchev allows only three types. These assumptions drive their convergence results. In order to assess the relative merits of the discrete and continuous time frameworks, one would need to considerably extend the former, allowing two-sided uncertainty, bilateral bargaining, and an unrestricted number of types, as we do. And importantly, one would need to consider semi-separating equilibria in order to allow the players to manipulate costs at will. But even under the restrictive assumptions adopted in existing discrete time models, the technical challenges involved in the search for semi-separating equilibria are daunting. be obtained let alone semi-separating equilibria that would be even harder to obtain given the non-linearity of Bayesian updating. In the continuous-time framework, by contrast, we modeling has been one of the primary motivations in the choice of our modeling framework. Without compelling evidence to the contrary, we have no reason to believe that it creates the results that we observe.
We now turn to our model and its consequences.
The Model: Timing, War Dynamics, Costs and
Bargaining
Our main objective is to understand how the convergence of beliefs about the rivals' war costs or priorities affects the bargaining process when the protagonists can make potentially war ending settlement offers at any time. To this end, we build a model that combines three elements: a continuous-time framework that allows all moves by each side and all developments of the war to occur at any point in time; a dynamic depiction of the war's progress using the standard Lanchester equations; and a bargaining protocol that allows each player to define alternative outcomes by making and updating offers at any point in the game.
The definition of player objectives as well as the solution concept used reflect all these elements.
War Dynamics
War can be conceptualized as a continuous process of loss and reinforcement that can lead to a variety of outcomes ranging from outright victory to stalemate on the battlefield. Its formal implementation takes the form of a system of differential equations as pioneered by Lanchester. 33 The standard Lanchester can use the calculus of integrals which is a far more powerful mathematical tool than the algebra of power series that must be used in discrete time models. This is, in fact, the main motivation for our modeling choice. model is deterministic, so that the players know in advance whether they are headed for the victory of one side or the other, or for a military stalemate.
Uncertainty in our model is about resolve rather than capabilities as the deterministic war model informs the players about their ultimate prospects in war.
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Assuming a deterministic path for war should favor use of the bargaining option, especially if one side is expecting defeat. Yet, in equilibrium, we will find that the protagonists prefer to remain uncompromising for much of the war.
The basic variable involved in the process of war is a force level z i (t) ≥ 0 for side i at time t. Player i's forces have a maximum size b i > 0 that is assumed constant for the duration of the war and the difference (b i − z i ) can be mobilized at rate a i ≥ 0. In the absence of combat losses, z i would grow
. But once combat has started, the opponent j's forces can destroy, disable or capture i's forces at a rate k i z j that is proportional to its own forces. The factor k i can be interpreted as i's vulnerability to j's attacks or as the capability of j. The resulting evolution equations read, for the two sides, as long as z i and z j ≥ 0,
and symmetrically for z j . This system of differential equations is formally identical to the so-called generalized Lanchester equations that can be found in Bellany.
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The evolution of the system depends on the quantities 
tem evolves toward a complete annihilation of j's forces (conversely i's forces) starting anywhere; (c) if q i < 0 and q j < 0 then the system evolves generically to the complete annihilation of one side or the other depending on the current force ratio.
Using the generalized Lanchester equations to describe the players' fate on the battlefield allows us to consider the three most interesting battlefield outcomes: In case (a) war will not resolve the dispute because the fighting will lead to a stalemate; in (b) war will inevitably lead to the victory of one well identified side; and in (c) initial force levels play decisive roles in determining the outcome.
Costs and Uncertainty
We assume that each side is uncertain about the other's willingness to continue the fight, despite the costs of battle and the perspective of defeat or hurting stalemate on the battlefield. We therefore introduce bilateral uncertainty about each other's resolve. We assume that costs reflect the maintenance and supply of a fighting force, the casualties inflicted by the enemy as well as possible collateral damage to property and society. Although our theory is not limited to this case, a typical formulation of such costs can be written:
with α i , β i and γ i ≥ 0. The term β i z j (t), which is commensurate with the other side's force level, reflects war casualties and at least some of the collateral damage. We also assume that costs fall to zero when hostilities end.
To model uncertainty about costs we assume that c i (τ ) = (1 − i)c I (τ ) for type i ∈ I = [0, 1] with c I (τ ) ≥ 0 common to side I and where ∈ (0, 1) is the initial magnitude of uncertainty. As an alternative, we could assume that some parameters of costs are common to all types while others are not. For instance β i might read β i = (1 − i)β I > 0 while all other elements of the cost function are common to all types. This would focus uncertainty on the cost of casualties.
In all cases, a higher value of i means a type that is less sensitive to the costs of war and therefore more resilient. In general, we assume that the very definition of types ensures that they are ordered by increasing strength so that ∂ci ∂i < 0 for all times t. For simplicity of presentation, we also assume a uniform initial distribution of the types.
Offers and the Bargaining Protocol
We assume that if one side's forces, I for instance, are annihilated at some time θ, meaning z i (θ) = 0, 37 then the victorious side J receives the entire prize in dispute and the game ends in that perpetual outcome. But we also allow each side to offer the other any share of that prize while they fight. 38 For instance, side I can offer side J any share y i (t) ∈ [0, 1] at any time t and can change it at any subsequent date as long as it has not been accepted. An offer y i (t) = 0 is valid and is interpreted as 'no offer' or as a demand for surrender. An offer can be accepted only after it is made and as long as it remains available. We impose no constraint on how soon the acceptance or withdrawal of an offer can be made. 39 But, since an offer made and withdrawn at the very same point in time could never be accepted we require that it remains open for some time, however brief, after it is made. This means that y i (t) must remain constant or evolve smoothly within some interval [t, t ) where t > t is chosen by side I.
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Surrender, or more generally the acceptance by type j ∈ J of an offer y i (t) at time t, whether it is a zero offer or not, ends the game. It yields the 37 z i is common to all types i on side I. 38 We, of course, assume that the prize is divisible at will or that compensations, monetary or other, allow such divisions. 39 By contrast, Perry and Reny, 'A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model' or Sakovics 'Delays in Bargaining Games' impose reaction delays. Our choice is motivated by our criticism that set unit periods exclude by design explanations other than uncertainty for war duration. 40 Technically, I's terms will be fully described by a function y i of time t that can be leftdiscontinuous but is right-continuous with a piecewise continuous derivative.
constant utilities u i (1 − y i (t)) and u j (y i (t)) to types i and j respectively for all future time s ≥ t. 41 Utilities are strictly increasing in one's share. Technically, we assume that u i (0) = 0, and u i (x) ≥ u > 0 for all i and x. If we choose to focus uncertainty on utilities rather than on costs it can be modeled by
with u I (x) common to side I and where ∈ (0, 1) is the initial magnitude of uncertainty.
Expected Utilities
The players in our model consider their discounted flow of utility to infinity as a guide to the decisions that they want to make. These farsighted players will consider the possibility that the war will end with a negotiated settlement, or the surrender of the enemy. And they will take the deterministic path of war and its costs into account when deciding whether to make a settlement offer at all. The expected utility that each player seeks to optimize must be defined to account for all possible contingencies and this is what we pursue now. Consider the possibility that the game involves fighting with cost flow c i (τ ) from an initial time arbitrarily set to t = 0 until an outcome yielding share x i to side I is reached at time s. Share x i can take any negotiated value in [0, 1] and is set to x i = 1 in case of military victory by i and to x i = 0 in case of i's military defeat. Type i's discounted payoff under these circumstances can be written:
where r i > 0 is a discount parameter that characterizes type i or is common to side I. The integral in (3) represents the cumulated costs of fighting until date s, appropriately discounted, while the second term measures the discounted 41 We also assume that an overgenerous offer y i (t) ≥ 1 − y j (t) by i at time t means an immediate acceptance of y j (t) and that simultaneous acceptances of mismatched offers have no effect. Making no explicit offer is interpreted as offering y i = 0. If the game ends at time θ in the military victory of one side the offers of the two sides are trivially set to the corresponding outcome (e.g., y i ≡ 0 for t ≥ θ if i wins) for notational consistency.
utility gained from enjoying share x i in perpetuity.
Let φ j (s) denote the probability that some type j ∈ J concedes, meaning surrenders or accepts side I's offer y i (s), by time s. And let dφ j (s) be the probability of that development within an infinitesimal interval ds at time s.
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Waiting time t for type i to concede then yields the expected payoff:
The integral term is the value associated to an expected concession by j before time t and the second term is the value to i of accepting j's standing offer at time t.
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The above probability φ j (t) corresponds to the belief, common to all types i ∈ I, about which types j ∈ J should have conceded by time t. 
The Best Alternative to Negotiation
To be acceptable to an active type i, an offer y j (t) by side J must be at least
as good as what i can guarantee himself by foregoing negotiations and fighting to the finish. If i is facing an inevitable defeat or a stalemate, he can guaran-
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The notation dφ j (s) rather than φ j (s)ds reflects the fact that φ j can be discontinuous.
At discontinuities dφ j (s) is a mass with magnitude equal to the size of the jump. 43 Implicit in (4) is the convention that π i (x i , s) ≡ π i (x i , θ) for s ≥ θ if a military outcome x i is reached at time θ. Therefore Eπ i (t) ≡ Eπ i (θ) for all t ≥ θ since, also by convention,
In the case of a non-uniform initial distribution of types j, the probability φ j would involve the beliefs about side J as well as the distribution of types.
tee himself nothing of value and can only eliminate costs by surrendering and accepting a share x i = 0. This is his best alternative to negotiation. Player i could instead be headed for imminent victory so that the utility of winning the entire prize, net of the remaining costs incurred to fight for it, is positive. His best alternative to any settlement would then be given by the expected value of fighting to the finish without talking. But this only occurs if victory is imminent so that the costs of fighting to the finish no longer overwhelm the discounted value of holding the prize in perpetuity. For most of the war then, the best alternative to negotiation for the winning side is also to surrender.
Formally, player i's best alternative to negotiation is the maximum share of the prize that is no better for him than fighting to the finish. It is not i's 
If i expects to win, ξ i (t) = 0 for most of the war but turns positive as victory nears. Since a stronger i always has a lower cost flow, ξ i (t) will turn positive sooner for the stronger winning side. But the loser's best alternative to negotiation remains zero regardless of type. If θ = ∞ because of an expected stalemate, then the best alternative to negotiation is nil for both sides regardless of type. In sum, ξ i (t) = 0 for both sides, regardless of type, for most of the war. It is important to keep this in mind as we show that, in equilibrium, it is best for each of the players to offer no more than the other's best alternative to negotiation until victory is near for one side or the other. This means that for most of the war it is optimal for each side to offer nothing and to rely on time passing, and the resulting observation of the other side's decision to surrender or not, for screening.
A Numerical Example
To illustrate the link between the dynamics on the battlefield and the bargaining range available to the players we work out a numerical example that will illustrate how the best alternative to negotiation varies with type.
First let a i = a j = 1, b i = b j = 1 and k i = k j = 2 in (1). Further assume that initial force levels for i and j are z As the war proceeds and i's victory becomes imminent, the best alternative to negotiation ξ i (t) also evolves. We assume further that discount parameter r i = 1 and that uncertainty is about costs with the range of costs for side I
given by:
Since side I is headed for victory at time θ the best alternative for any type i will become positive as t approaches θ. The stronger types i have lower costs and therefore experience a higher payoff from fighting to the finish. For instance, ξ i (t) becomes positive at t 1.0 for i = 1 while i = 0 must wait until t 1.34 for this to happen. In this example, even the strongest type on side I has a zero best alternative to negotiation for more than half of the war. The situation is pictured in Figure 1 below. The weakest type on side I incurs the highest war costs. The expected value of fighting to the finish therefore turns positive later for type i = 0 than it does for the strongest type i = 1. As illustrated in Figure 1 , type i = 1's best alternative, schedule ξ i=1 , turns positive at t 1 while for type i = 0 this does not happen until t 1.34. Past these dates both ξ i=1 and ξ i=0 grow as remaining battle costs decrease and the discounted value of the prize grows as it becomes increasingly within close reach. As the war ends with j's defeat in battle, schedules ξ i=1 and ξ i=0 converge to the present value of the entire prize, set to 1.
As j is headed for defeat, ξ j (t) ≡ 0 at all dates t whatever his type. The range of offers that could be rationally entertained by the two sides should therefore begin to shrink at some time t ∈(1, 1.34), depending on how much uncertainty has been resolved, until it reduces to the point ξ i (θ) = 1 and ξ j (θ) = 0 at victory time θ
How will war end and what concessions will the rivals make?
This is what we find out by examining the equilibria of our bargaining and war game.
War and Bargaining in Equilibrium
Following much of the formal literature we use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Markov strategies (MPBE) as solution concept. To investigate the convergence of offers and beliefs and its role in determining the duration of wars, we focus on separating equilibria, that allow the players to learn about each other's types by observing behavior.
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The Findings
The formal analysis of our model is presented in appendix and proceeds in three phases. We first obtain the optimal acceptance time for each type, given the two sides' offers, and the corresponding consistent beliefs. We then characterize optimal offers given consistent beliefs. We finally show the existence of a unique 45 While pooling equilibria may exist, players would not learn about each others' types, convergence could not take place and the issue of convergence would be moot. And semiseparating equilibria would picture each individual type making probabilistic decisions, a feature that is unnecessary given our continuum of types and would raise interpretation problems.
MPBE. The properties of that equilibrium are found to be incompatible with the Principle of Convergence. Offers fall into three classes:
First, the offers that we call convergent drive a separation of types and are significant as they grant the other side a positive share that typically exceeds their best alternative to negotiation. For example an offer schedule that would propose a gradually increasing share of the prize over time, with the increase calibrated to encourage types on the other side to accept an early settlement rather than fight to the bitter end would be a convergent offer. It would accelerate the screening of types and reduce the duration of the war. Resolution of uncertainty through bargaining would then be determining of how long the war lasts. An equilibrium involving bilateral convergent offers would therefore support the Principle of Convergence. Indeed, convergence requires that offers actually be made and that the resulting screening process ensures that the players learn from their opponent's response to their offers.
Second, at the boundary of the set of convergent offers lies the set we simply refer to as 'boundary offers.' Such offers may be either separating or significant, but they cannot have both features. If a boundary offer drives a separation of types it must match the other side's best alternative to a negotiated settlement.
As long as fighting to the finish is more costly than the discounted value of the prize enjoyed in perpetuity, the best alternative to a negotiated settlement is nil, the boundary offer is also nil and types are revealed by the simple passage of time for those unwilling to continue the fight. If, instead, a boundary offer is significant it is because the other side is nearing victory and enjoys a positive best alternative to negotiation. This significant offer then has the effect of hiding the types of the losing side that makes it and therefore fails to be separating.
Third and last, we define the set of offers that are unacceptable. For example, an offer that falls below the other side's best alternative to negotiation would never be accepted by a rational player and therefore joins the set of unacceptable offers. But there are other types of offers that that would never be rationally accepted. It turns out that offers that increases too fast or that involve discontinuities are also unacceptable because they prompt the other side to wait with certainty for a while.
On the way to building the proof of our main theorem, we obtain two substantive results. The first result (Lemma 8 in appendix) asserts that a convergent offer can always be profitably reduced by the side that makes it. The intuition behind this result is as follows: a substantial offer accelerates the screening of the other side's type by prompting each type on the other side to end the war sooner than it would by relying on its resilience alone. Thus accepting the substantial offer reduces war costs by shortening the fight. But it turns out that the reduced war costs for the side making the compromise offer do not compensate for the receiving of a reduced share of the prize and this speaks in favor of reducing the size of the offer. Indeed, the compromising side could, with some probability, be facing a type on the other side who would have surrendered right away. And the expected gain from reduced war costs does not match the expected loss from giving away part of the prize to a possibly weak type on the other side. The second result (Lemma 9) implies that optimal offers can never match, meaning that there is always a spread between the two sides'
proposals, unless and until one side reaches victory. As a result, in this continuous time framework, it is not rational to reach an early compromise without fighting. These two first results lead to our central theorem that establishes the existence of an equilibrium that must involves boundary offers on each side.
In sum, equilibrium behavior in our model involves standing firm and making no concession for most of the war. In fact, if there is stalemate, optimal behavior dictates that neither side ever makes any concession despite the ongoing convergence of beliefs. As a result, the game turns into a pure war of We now turn to a numerical example to illustrate these findings.
A Numerical Example
Consider again our example in which I is the winning side. Also assume that utilities are given by u i (x) = x. Finally assume symmetric parameters for side J , except that j's costs are given by c j (z i , z j ) =(3 − j)(z i + z j ). Each type i ∈ I has an expected payoff Eπ i (t) defined by (4) given the two sides' respective of-fers and beliefs. We illustrate expected payoffs for the three types i = 0, 0.5 and 1, given side J 's optimal offer y j which we will describe in Figure 3 below. We consider two possible offers y i ≡ 0 and y i ≡ 0.20 by side I and trace out, in Figure 2 , the expected payoff to the three types of waiting time t to accept side J 's outstanding offer. Expected payoffs on the veritical axis are measured against waiting times on the horizontal t axis. optimal offer y j becomes positive. y j initially lies below the strongest type's (i = 1) best alternative ξ i=1 but somewhat above ξ i=0.878 . So, for t > t * there is a range of types i ∈ (0.878, 1) for whom the optimal y j (t) is strictly above their best alternative ξ i (t) and is therefore a small concession. Offer y j increases at a rate that results in the constant consistent belief φ j as all remaining active types j adamantly refuse to accept side I 's optimal offer y i ≡ 0. 46 Offer y j is therefore a boundary offer as it is either nil or prevents the separation of types on side J .
The fact that side J 's optimal offer increases over time leads the stronger types on side I to wait before accepting, although the current offer exceeds 46 The positive part of y j satisfies the boundary condition λ i=φ i ≡ 0 discussed in appendix (Definition 2).
their current best alternative to negotiation. Recall that side I's acceptance time is determined by maximizing its expected payoff from waiting to accept J 's optimal offer as illustrated in Figure 2 . Expecting better offers to come their way, active types on side I will optimize their expected payoffs by fighting longer, delaying acceptance, and after time t * , active types i will be accepting deals that are strictly better than fighting to the finish. Of course, the stronger types will only accept the more generous offers. For example, types i close to 1 will only accept an offer that is close to the entire prize. And the strongest type on side I, i = 1, will fight to the finish for the entire prize.
Discussion
The uncompromising bargaining behavior that emerges from the our results persists as each side gathers more information about the type he is facing. more complete or decisions become more frequent that process converges to a true compromise offer that is beneficial to both sides. By contrast, we have shown that if both players are allowed to make offers and accept them at the time of their choosing they do not make any meaningful compromise, at least until the imminent victory of one side. Instead, they both demand that the other accept the minimum it can guarantee itself by continuing to fight, which means complete surrender for much of the war. Most importantly, this divergence persists as uncertainty vanishes and regardless of the identity of the expected winner.
Our rivals are out to identify the weakest of the two sides rather than the weakest among the opponent's types. If one were to make a concession, then all types on the other side would accept sooner. But if the side to offer compromise happens to be stronger than the other, it forgoes the opportunity to see its opponent just take a minimal offer. With a compromise offer on the table, war might be shorter and therefore less costly. But these expected savings do not compensate for the benefit of having a weak type on the other side decide to make do with his best alternative to negotiation. In equilibrium, our rivals implement passive screening for much of the war, offering no concession and hoping that the other side will give in before they do. Only when it is facing imminent defeat does one side begin making significant offers in order to cut short its losses, while adamantly refusing to capitulate. According to our model, wars erupt and endure because the rivals do not rationally seek compromise until the impending victory of one side. This is in stark contrast with the idea that wars are fought to inform on the terms of the bargain that each is willing to accept.
The attrition behavior that our model predicts can be tested for empirically.
Indeed, the failure of both parties to offer concessions in equilibrium implies, technically, that the likelihood that each side will give in increases as the flow costs of war incurred by the other side increase (see formula (A4) in Appendix).
Langlois and Langlois 54 test this relationship. Specifically, the attrition behavior that our model anticipates involves weighing the expected costs of war against the chances that the other side will give in to one's demands. The lower the believed likelihood that the opponent will give in, the lower the flow costs one should be willing to bear for the same prize. If beliefs are an accurate prediction of rational behavior, this implies that higher war flow costs suffered by one side are associated to a higher probability of surrender or concession by the other. bargain freely while fighting in the time continuum. Uncertainty and bargaining are bilateral and the rivals can make offers and counteroffers at the time of their choosing. In our model warfare is an ongoing process that allows for stalemate as well as victory by one side or the other. In this context we find that, in equilibrium, the rivals will adopt uncompromising bargaining positions, preferring to fight it out in the hope that the other side will give in first.
Uncompromising bargaining behavior prevails as long as there is a chance that the other side will surrender under the continued pressure of battle costs.
Only when defeat is imminent will the losing side offer small one-sided concessions. In our model, only the dynamic progression of battle towards one side's ultimate demise prompts the loser to sue for peace and offer concessions. As long as defeat is remote or uncertain, the potential for the opponent's surrender drives the rivals to adopt uncompromising positions despite the increasing likelihood that their opponent is resilient. The progress of battle informs on the resilience of the rivals but it does not bring them to the bargaining table. In equilibrium, the convergence of beliefs does not lead to a convergence of settlement offers. The active screening that is at the core of the process of convergence does not take place, and the Principle of Convergence does not hold.
Mathematical Appendix
If i believes that, at time t, all types j ∈ [0, φ j (t)) have been screened out then only those types in the segment [φ j (t), 1] remain active. If we further write
then φ j (s|t) represents i's beliefs, conditional on reaching time t, about what segment of [φ j (t), 1] will have been screened out after a further delay s. Using more generally the notation 's|t' for all variables evaluated at (t+s), conditional on reaching time t, one can rewrite i's expected payoff defined in (4) for waiting time (t + s), with s ≥ 0, as
with
where π i (y j (s|t), s|t) is as in (1) Eπ i (s|t) is i's expected payoff from time t on and it has the very same structure as Eπ i (s). Sequential rationality thus requires the maximizing of Eπ i (s|t) at each time t over s and offer function y i (.|t) given beliefs. This is clearly equivalent to optimization from the very start by (A2) as long as φ j (t) < 1.
For simplicity of exposition we state and prove all claims with initial t = 0.
In particular, one has φ j (0|t) = 0 just like φ j (0) = 0, but this assumes that current belief φ j (t) at time t is accounted for by (A2). The general case only requires the burdensome notation 's|t' in all statements and proofs below.
A belief-strategy profile is called consistent if beliefs are consistent with strategies according to Bayes' Law. Since offer functions y i and y j are assumed right-differentiable and piecewise C 1 , we find that consistent beliefs inherit the same properties. If φ i is continuous and increasing at time t it means that i = φ i (t) is the single type i who accepts optimally j's offer y j (t) at time t. A discontinuity ∆φ
] accepts y j (t) at time t. But ∆φ i (t) > 0 could also result from signaling, if side I makes an offer y i at time t that no type in
could make. 55 However, we will find that all active types i have the same optimal offer y i and that such signaling is suboptimal. So we focus on acceptance as the updating instrument.
We say that offers 'match' at time t if y i (t) + y j (t) = 1 but y i (s) + y j (s) < 1 55 If only types i ≥ i * can make offer y i optimally and φ i (t − ) < i * was side J 's belief just before that offer, belief jumps to φ i (t) = i * at time t.
for all s < t. When offers match the two sides agree on the split and the game ends. 56 Offers are assumed defined for all times even if they match before the game ends.
For simplicity of exposition, we also assume that u i (x) = x although all proofs are easily extendable to the case where u i is a strictly increasing C 1 function. 57 We denote by δ(s) = 1 − y i (s) − y j (s) the spread between the two side's offers. Also for simplicity we denote by λ i=φi (s) the quantity λ i (s)| i=φi(s) , and similarly for ξ i=φi and c i=φi .
We first characterize optimal acceptance times and the resulting consistent beliefs. where offers are differentiable, consistent beliefs must satisfy:
Proof. Since φ j is a distribution function it is differentiable almost everywhere (a.e.). And since offers are piecewise C 1 , i accepts optimally at time s ∈ (0, t)
only if the first order condition dEπi(s) ds
holds (a.e). Simplifying (A5) yields
By consistency of beliefs, (A6) must hold at s for the single type i = φ i (s).
Since λ i (s) is piecewise continuous, belief φ j is piecewise C 1 (i.e. it inherits 56 An 'overmatching' offer y i (t) > 1 − y j (t) would be quickly accepted by side J and would be a net loss for any i who could accept 1 − y j (t) instead. 57 One replaces y j by u i (y j ), 1 − y j by u i (1 − y j ) and y j by u i (y j )y j in all formulae.
the properties of offers). And (A4) also hold at s = 0 in the sense of the right-hand-side derivative.
By (A4), the inequality λ i=φi ≥ 0 is necessary for φ j to represent side I's beliefs. Clearly, the sign of λ i is determined by y j . But the condition λ i=φi ≡ 0
within Ω = [0, t) can occur and implies constant beliefs φ j (s) ≡ 0. However, the condition λ i=φi < 0 obtains if y j increases sufficiently fast within Ω. In that case, (A4) cannot hold but we will show that consistent beliefs must then remain constant. Consistent beliefs will also remain constant when none of the types can rationally accept within the given interval. This occurs if offer y j (s) falls below the best alternative ξ i (s) to negotiation for all active types i ≥ φ i (s)
in Ω. We therefore make:
Definition 2. Given consistent beliefs, an offer y i is called in Ω = [0, t) 58 Intuitively, offer y j increases so fast that all types i prefer to wait until it levels off.
dEπi(s) ds
at s such that i = φ i (s). So, this i cannot accept optimally at that time s and consistent belief φ i can only be constant in Ω.
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To complete our description of consistent beliefs we consider discontinuities in offers.
Lemma 3. Assume that ∆y i (t) = y i (t) − y i (t − ) > 0. Then side I' consistent belief φ j must be constant in some Ω = [t , t). Moreover, unless offer y j is such that λ i=φi ≡ 0 in Ω, side J 's consistent belief φ i must also be constant in Ω.
Proof. Let ∆φ i (t) = φ i (t) − φ i (t − ) ≥ 0 and let j = φ j (s) be the type that accepts optimally at s ∈ Ω. This requires that Eπ j (s) ≥ Eπ j (t). But
So, if t < t is sufficiently close to t, all Eπ j (s) < Eπ j (t) and no j can accept optimally in Ω. The same arguments as in Lemma 2 then apply.
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So, a positive jump in offer y i at t creates an interval before t where y i is also 'unacceptable' with the very same consequences on consistent beliefs.
We therefore can extend the definition of unacceptable offer to the case of a discontinuous jump at t, within an adequate interval Ω = [t , t). A negative drop ∆y i (t) < 0 can be characterized similarly. 61 In fact, it requires an interval after t where the offer is unacceptable in order for beliefs to be consistent. But 59 The case λ i=φ i (s) ≡ 0 allows an increasing belief φ i while offer y i is unacceptable. The consequences for belief φ i are only given for the completeness of Lemma 4. But only the consequences on belief φ j are necessary in the Main Theorem at the end. 60 Intuitively, a jump in y i is an 'extremely fast' increase which was found unacceptable in Lemma 2.
61 Consistent beliefs would have to jump according to: this last result will not be needed in our proofs since we will only consider drops from a minimum acceptable offer that are trivially unacceptable.
We now have a clearer picture of consistent beliefs: unacceptable offers yield constant beliefs within a corresponding interval. And those with a discontinuous jump have a similar effect. Since we will obtain an equilibrium in continuous offers we initially focus on the continuous case and will eventually show that unacceptable, including discontinuous, offers are suboptimal. Proof. We can rewrite (A4) in view of Lemmata 2 and 3
with ρ(s) = 0 if λ i=φi (s) < 0 or y i or y j unacceptable (but λ j=φj (s) > 0) 1 otherwise and symmetrically for φ i = f i (φ i , φ j , s). Clearly, f i and f j are piecewise continuous in s. And they have bounded partial derivatives in φ i and φ j . Given initial φ i (0) = φ j (0) = 0 this first order system of differential equations has a unique solution by Picard's Theorem. 63 The solution satisfies
This clearly defines a distribution function and therefore beliefs. Moreover φ j in (A11) fits the conditions of Lemmata 1, 2 and 3, and therefore defines the unique consistent beliefs. Finally, λ i=φi and λ j=φj depend continuously on offers and so do φ i and φ j . 64 We can define φ j (t) = lim s→t − φ j (s). If offers match at time t, then φ j becomes infinite and φ j (t) = 1 provided λ i=φ i > 0. If beliefs need to be defined for s ≥ t we simply set them
We now restrict our attention to continuous acceptable profiles and obtain necessary conditions of optimality within that set. We still denote victory time (for either side) by θ ≤ ∞. The case θ = ∞ means battlefield stalemate.
Lemma 5. If side J expects to win the war at time θ, or if θ = ∞, then the minimum acceptable offer y * j for side J is y * j (t) ≡ 0.
Proof. Since side I cannot win ξ i (t) ≡ 0 for all i. And since y * j yields λ i (t) > 0 for all i and t, it is acceptable. Since no offer can be negative this is the minimum. 
If we let Lemma 7. For any (continuous acceptable) profile in an interval Ω = [0, t) and for all active types i ∈ I and for all s ∈ Ω:
in (A5) must be piecewise continuous, we may write
Replacing (A4) into (A17) and simplifying yields (A16). to y j in a continuous acceptable profile then it must be the minimum y * i .
67 It is entirely possible that y * i and y j match at some t < θ. In that case, belief φ i may (or may not) reach the value 1 in the interval [t, θ] . Also note that y j need not be acceptable in this argument.
68 If the game has ended by time t ≥ θ, we have c I (τ |t) ≡ 0, the integrand in (A7) is nil and Eπ i (s|t) = y j (t) ≡ y j (θ) where y j (θ) is the outcome of war or the agreed upon bargain at time θ.
Proof. First assume that offer y i is convergent in some interval denoted Ω = [0, t) and let t i ≥ 0 be such that type i = φ i (t i ) accepts optimally at time t i ∈ Ω.
Also denote by L i [y i ] the integrand in (A16) evaluated at s = t i . Type i seeks an offer y i that maximizes L i [y i ].
69 Now, for all s ∈ Ω, let η(s) = s − t, and
By continuity, for h > 0 small enough, y
Since the last term is nil by i = φ i (t i ), 71 we only need to show that the integrand is negative at h = 0 so that y h i is strictly better than y i for h > 0 small enough. We have this is unsuccessful here because of the non-linearity of (A4). Indeed, the resulting 'costate equations' are not solvable. However, we do use a method borrowed from Variational Calculus in (A19).
70 If λ i=φ i = 0 then y h i has no effect on λ i=φ i which remains nil.
71 ∂t i ∂h can obtained by differentiating the identity i = φ i (t i ). 72 We must choose t so that offers are not matching or γ could become unbounded. be the infimum of all such types. If any type i ≥ i * , makes a convergent offer y i in Ω it 'signals out' all types i < i * and consistent belief φ i must be updated so that we may now let i * = φ i (0) = 0. Since belief φ j is unaffected, the offer y i is still convergent in Ω. But, by the above argument, y i can't be optimal.
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Second, assume instead that y i is a boundary offer other than y * i in some interval Ω. If the current time (denoted 0) is close enough to θ this requires y i ≥ y * i ≥ ξ j=φj > 0, with resulting λ j=φj ≡ 0 and therefore φ i ≡ 0 in Ω. So, y i is strictly increasing. Without loss of generality we can assume that y i (t) = 1 at time t < θ, otherwise it would be equal to y * i . Solving λ j=φj = 0 with y i (t) = 1 yields, for all s ∈ Ω y i (s) = e rj (s−t) − and a decreased boundary y i is strictly better for all active types i.
74
The only offer that cannot be improved upon and is therefore the only possible best reply for all active types is the minimum y * i .
We have only obtained necessary conditions for best-reply offers within the set of continuous acceptable profiles. In the next result we show that there exists an equilibrium within that set and characterize it. We then show that it is a MPBE of the game without the restriction to continuous acceptable offers.
Lemma 9. Within the set of continuous acceptable profiles there exists a unique MPBE and it is made up of the minimum acceptable offers y * i and y * j .
Proof. If there is no victory time θ < ∞ we pick an arbitrary (large but finite)
θ and impose the restriction that y i (s) ≡ y i (θ) for all s ≥ θ. Since decreasing acceptable offers are convergent and cannot be best replies by Lemma 8, we can limit our search for an optimum to the set A i of non-decreasing continuous acceptable offers. Since A i is a closed subset of − S i (in Lemma 6) it is compact.
Since the operator L i [y i ] is continuous in y i it must reach a maximum over A i .
If side I is not losing, this maximizand can only be the (unique) minimum acceptable y * i ≡ 0 that is common to all active types i. If side I is losing then side J is winning and y * j ≡ 0. But there is a unique maximizand y * i of L i [y i ] in response to y * j by Lemma 6 for all active types i. And if there is a stalemate y * i ≡ 0 is the optimum for any finite θ and therefore for all times.
We denote by E the pair (y * i , y * j ) formed by the above minima together with consistent beliefs (φ * i , φ * j ). 75 We now show that E is in fact an unrestricted
MPBE.
Theorem. The profile E of Lemma 9 forms a MPBE of the game.
74 Optimal t i ≤ t here is the time at which offers match and can only increase with t. 75 Of course, all arguments are valid in the 's|t' sense and therefore hold for any current history and beliefs, thus ensuring sequential rationality.
Proof. First observe that a discontinuous jump in offer is unacceptable in some
interval Ω by Lemma 3. And a discontinuous drop from the minimum acceptable offer can only be unacceptable. So, we only need to show that unacceptable offers are suboptimal. Consider an interval [0, t) where y i is unacceptable in response to y * j . By Lemma 2, consistent belief φ j become constant (equal to 0) in Ω and the expected payoff for any active type i reduces to Eπ i (s) = π i (y * j (s)) in Ω. If we denote by Eπ * i (s) the expected payoff under E we have two cases for y * j :
(1) λ i=φ * i ≡ 0 in Ω. In that case φ * j ≡ 0 and Eπ * i (s) ≡ π i (y * j (s)) = Eπ i (s). So, there can be no improvement for any type i in switching to y i ; (2) y * j ≡ 0 and all λ i > 0. In that case, one easily verifies that for all s ∈ Ω:
But this is equivalent to Eπ * i (s) > π i (y * j (s)) = Eπ i (s). So, all active types i's expected payoffs are uniformly decreased in all Ω by the switch to y i . Moreover, all conditional expected payoffs Eπ i (s|t) in (A3) are unchanged since y i is unchanged after time t. So, all expected payoffs are uniformly decreased for all times under the switch. In particular, optimal expected payoffs are uniformly decreased. And this holds for any t.
